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I. Corporate Governance and liability 
 
Company laws have long been searching for the perfect system of safeguards in order to ensure 
the credibility and solvency of companies, and to protect the best interests of the creditors. This 
understandable attempt invoked shifts of paradigms multiple times over the past few decades. 
As the economic environment and market rules have a huge impact on the evolution of company 
laws worldwide, the new challenges of the 21st century – especially the aftermath of the most 
recent financial crisis – raise new questions in the area of company law. Companies are the 
creations of national laws as international business law and even the supranational law of the 
European Union have not been able to establish a framework system for companies.1 This 
phenomenon results in very diverse concepts for company laws even in countries that being 
geographically close to each other. Not only universal unification or harmonization but regional 
approximation of laws suffers from firm motivation of the states as they all believe that 
company laws must reflect national specialties as parts of the culturally diverse field of private 
law. Another obvious opposition of the states these days is the fact the company law may boost 
economy and the willingness of foreign investors to start businesses in the given country. In 
case of a desired approximation, even in a regional level, the competitiveness of some countries 
may also be in danger, and investors would not consider company law as a relevant factor when 
making their decision on where to position the company. The other angle of such diversity is 
that national laws aim to provide safeguards to the creditors in different ways. These safeguards 
may be categorized based on what aspect of company law they select as the ground for ensuring 
warranties. It can be the core capital, the internal structure and the relationship between the 
various company bodies, or the liability of the key figures acting on behalf of the company. 
None of these ideas were proved to be perfect offering a solution to all possible claims of the 
creditors, however, weaknesses and strengths may be identified in the various concepts, and the 
position the state takes on this important questions most likely describe the general approach to 
company law in the given country. We tend to believe that every decision in the area of 
company law has impact on the decisions of the investors, therefore, it results changes in the 
attitude of the investors that impact the economy and the market in that state. However, if we 
really want to be honest, the nature and content of company law is just one of the many factors 
investors consider when making a decision on where and how to run their businesses. Tax laws, 
procedural rules, access to justice and alternative dispute resolution methods are equally 
important, and the obvious factor of consumers’ buying power, wealth, political stability and 
other natural attributes of the market all play significant roles in this respect.  
For decades, company laws followed a somewhat simple approach to provide safeguards to 
creditors against the insolvency and fraud of companies. This approach believed that in case a 
business association type (typically partnerships) involves background liability of the members 
for the debts of the business association, the core capital has no function in providing safeguards 
to creditors, therefore, minimum requirements for the core capital were either non-existent or 
served only one purpose: to get the members engaged in the business activity and make them 
invest something at the formation stage. In case the law established for a business association 
type allowed members/shareholders to limit their liability for the debts of the company, the law 
commonly imposed a minimum core capital obligation to the founders in exchange for their 
limited liability. This theory worked – and in some places it still holds – as a form of pre-check 
 
1 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc. Case 81/87 par. 20 
at the stage of establishing a company, and allowed company registration courts or authorities 
to decide whether the company complies with the legal requirements and can get allowed to 
step on to the market and start conducting business activity. Soon, however, this core capital 
centered concept proved to be somewhat inefficient during the operation of companies as the 
core capital requirements at the formation stage could not ensure that those acting on behalf of 
the company take all necessary and reasonable steps to prevent the insolvency of the company 
as their liability was not an issues since they ‘purchased’ their immunity when they complied 
with the minimum core capital requirements. The end of the 20th century and then the financial 
crisis in 2008 urged legislators and courts to evolve new concepts in order to guarantee the 
protection of the creditors and to ensure the transparent operation of the business associations. 
Wrongful trading rules, however, were established for the managers and those considered to be 
the key personnel of companies at the early stage of the shift of concepts. Still, legislators and 
courts had to face the fact that the decision-making bodies of the companies that consist of the 
shareholders/partners may play an equally important role in pushing the company to insolvency 
through bad, malicious or unreasonably risky decisions. The various models on the relationship 
between the decision-making body and the management of a company also raised concerns that 
shareholders/members may also be liable for the debts of the company toward the creditors in 
certain situations. The liability of shareholders is obviously more eminent in private companies, 
close corporations than in public ones as shareholders have a more obvious control over the 
company’s operations. Also, in the special situation of company groups (e.g. holdings) and 
dominant, majority shareholders, the liability of shareholders get to another dimension. This 
study analyzes the theoretical considerations behind the concept on shareholders’ liability in 
general, and describes selected models and cases in Europe and in the United States in order to 
identify the new trends and cases when the liability of shareholders toward the company or its 
creditors and third parties may be relevant. 
 
II. The internal structure of companies and the interaction between the organs 
 
Most company structure models accept that one body of the company, the supreme body cannot 
be seized from its general function: to serve as a decision-making body. It also results that the 
various models leave the decision-making power of the supreme body intact and their primary 
focus is on how to ensure that the management is properly supervised for the best interest of 
the company and the shareholders. The supreme body, however, has a right to transfer some of 
its powers to either the management or the supervisory board. Most jurisdictions leave only a 
few fundamental decisions in the hand of the supreme body: to decide on the financial report 
of the company and to decide on what to do with the profit. This is why in many public 
companies, the general meeting of the shareholders is only called once a year and only to 
discuss these two strategical decisions. The rest of their competences are delegated to the 
management. In the German structure model, the supervisory board gets decision-making 
powers over the management of the company in order to promptly sanction any irregular or 
potentially harmful act of the management.2 In this case, the shareholders do not have evaluate 
the concerns of the supervisory board, they only have to pick the right and trustworthy members 
to the supervisory board. The classic structure concept on the clear separation of duties believe 
that decision-making must remain in the hands of the shareholders. It grants the final decision 
to the supreme body, and the supervisory board only monitors the activity of the management 
and report the irregular or potentially harmful acts to the supreme body that will eventually rule 
on the question.3 Finally, the third structure model merges the functions of management and 
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supervision into one special body, the board of directors that involves executive and non-
executive directors as well, providing typically majority voting rights to the non-executives in 
questions of the management.4 We should see that the shareholders take very different positions 
depending on which structure model the company follows. In case of the strong supervisory 
board and the board of directors concepts, the shareholders have limited options to get close to 
the operation of the company, therefore, their potential to cause damage to third parties or to 
the company itself is minimal. In case of clear separation of powers model, the shareholders 
can and do keep a close eye on the operation of the company, and they may be involved in the 
process that ultimately pushes the company to the edge of insolvency. Even in this model, the 
question of liability may become very complicated. Corporate torts also presume some fault on 
the side of the tortfeasors, in our case, the shareholders. Fault, however, is a very fragmented 
category as the method on how to measure someone’s negligence or intention strongly depends 
on the following factors: the level of his knowledge, access to information, state of mind, 
professionalism etc. We cannot state that shareholders are professionals in every case and that 
they understand the way of business in the sector the company is acting in. Therefore, general 
rules are difficult to establish based on the simple fact whether the shareholder supported the 
wrong and harmful decision or not. Company laws typically suggest that shareholders are 
persons that also need protection against the management, and minority shareholders may enjoy 
extra rights against the decisions of the majority.5 This approach suggests that shareholders take 
different positions when we examine their level of knowledge, their access to information, and 
their professionalism and competency related to business matters. This is why in a limited 
liability company, the starting point is that shareholders will not held liable for the debts of the 
company and for the unsatisfied claims of the creditors. Still, it is not difficult to feel the 
anomaly between the function of the supreme body and its members, the shareholders, and this 
somewhat lenient interpretation of fault. The supreme body of the company has authority over 
the acting organs and persons of the company by electing them, supervising them, authorizing 
them and showing guidance to them through some strategical decisions (e.g. amending the 
instrument of constitution, the articles, deciding on raising or reducing capital etc.). It means 
that these decisions of the supreme body also function as beacons to the management, and the 
acts of the management can only be judged through these instructions. If these instructions are 
proved to be wrong and harmful, managers may have a successful defense against a tort claim, 
and also the creditors can easily be left without satisfaction.6 The structure of the company may 
seem to be a question of internal matters of the company, and still, it has a significant impact 
on whether the liability of shareholders may become an issue or not.  
 
III. The concept of limited liability – win or lose for shareholders 
 
Limited liability became the essential characteristic for most companies, and it successfully 
resulted that shareholders may invest in multiple firms, creating a diverse stock portfolio, while 
it also led to the fact that more investors could participate in the market.7 The doctrine of limited 
liability, however, eroded especially because corporate torts (e.g. environmental torts, 
accounting frauds) claimed for a concept that allowed creditors to pierce that thick corporate 
veil. We have to state that the concept of limited liability only protects the shareholders’ assets 
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and the assets of the company. Also, the doctrine of limited liability only counts if the tort or 
wrongdoing was committed by the company. In case the shareholder acts in a tortious capacity, 
outside the general scope of the limited liability doctrine, he may be held liable personally. The 
important question is to identify these cases when the shareholders did not act under scope of 
this principle, rather, they stepped out of the veil of the company and committed a tortious act. 
Limited liability should only protect shareholders against the claims of creditors and other third 
parties (e.g. injured parties of a tort claim) if the claim arose from an activity that can be 
recognized as the general risk of conducting business activities. A company becoming insolvent 
does not necessarily means that it is a case when the shareholders must bear individual 
responsibility for the unsatisfied debts. We need an extra factor based on the circumstances that 
justify the claim against the shareholders. This link has to be obvious and certain. Cases in 
various jurisdictions analyzed situations when the shareholders used their limited liability to 
maliciously satisfy their personal needs not in relation to the business activity of the company 
using the company’s assets8, cases when the shareholders kept the management in tight leash 
and practically forced their will to them that eventually led to insolvency9, and cases when the 
sole member of the company was found personally liable for the debts as the sole purpose of 
setting up a company was to create a scheme, a front to his malicious activity10. A shareholder 
was also found liable for the company’s debts and the doctrine on the corporate veil was pierced 
by the court when the shareholder made an economically destructive withdrawal. Such liability, 
however, can only arise if the shareholder intentionally inflicted damage on the company by 
withdrawing assets which would have been necessary to settle the company’s debts, and that 
led to the insolvency of the company.11 All these cases have one thing in common: shareholders 
abused their limited liability, and this is why they were found liable.  
The concept of limited liability of the shareholders go back to the original approach on 
companies that these entities are separate from their founders, therefore, they have their own 
assets and their own liability for the decisions private individuals make on their behalves. Case 
law attached to limited liability, however, changed a lot almost everywhere in the world. The 
famous case of the United Kingdom, Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd set grounds for the 
theory on the company being a separate legal entity back in 1896.12 The case analyzed whether 
the shareholder owning the vast majority of the shares in a company can be held liable for the 
act of the company. According to the facts, Salomon sold his own company the business of 
making boots and shoes he conducted as a private entrepreneur. Mr. Salomon and his family 
members were the shareholders of the company in question. The company – under a contract - 
purchased the business of the private entrepreneur and issued the shares to Salomon and his 
family members. Parallel to these events, the company issued a debenture to Mr. Salomon that 
was secured by a floating charge on the assets. The business soon became insolvent, and the 
creditors of the company sued Salomon instead of the insolvent company, claiming that 
Salomon and his company were basically one and the same. They claimed that his debenture 
was void as no one can be his own creditor. The court sustained the concept of limited liability 
and that the company was a legal entity separate from its founder and rejected the claim. 
Another case from the common law world, however, took a different position even if the claim 
related to a contractual obligation. In the Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne case, Mr. Horne 
– a former employee of Gilford Motor Company – quit in order to establish his own limited 
liability company.13 Before quitting, Mr. Horn had to agree in the form of a contract that he 
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would not solicit any of his former employer’s, Gilford Motor Company’s customers. Horne 
claimed that he took that obligation as a private individual and that his newly formed company 
is a separate legal entity that is individually liable for its own actions, and he as the shareholder 
of the company cannot represent the company and its will. The court ruled for Gilford Motor 
and observed that the company and Horne were one and the same, and Horne committed a 
fraudulent activity when he tried to go behind his contractual obligation by forming a company. 
It is really difficult to see a pattern here. Both cases were about contractual obligations, still, 
the court in the Salomon case enforced the concepts of limited liability and separate legal entity, 
while in the Gilford Motor Company case, the judge went behind the company veil concept and 
allowed the plaintiff to get protection against the fraudulent activity of the shareholder. If we 
take an in-depth analysis of the two cases, we can see a notable difference in the facts. In 
Salomon, it is really difficult to prove the intention of Salomon that forming a limited liability 
company served a fraudulent purpose. Since Salomon’s family got involved in the business and 
that required Salomon to transfer his successful business to the family run company, the 
insolvency does not seem to be an intentional fraud of Salomon. In Gilford case, however, 
Horne clearly set up the company to escape from the contractual obligation he took, therefore, 
the exception under the limited liability rule seemed adequate. The Gilford argument was 
applicable in the Kelner v Baxter case as well. Baxter and two of his associates took an 
obligation on behalf of a company yet to be formed to buy trade stocks for their businesses.14 
Later, they formed the company, and accepted and used the trade stock but never paid for the 
stock. The court ruled that since the company was not even formed when Baxter and his 
associates took the obligation, they had to bear responsibility for paying the stock. The company 
could not be held liable as it could not ratify a pre-incorporation contract with retrospective 
effect to a date before the company existed. The Kelner case proved that courts can easily 
penetrate through the company’s protective veil in cases when the shareholders acted with clear 
fraudulent intention. On the other hand, when the shareholder is the one that requires that his 
assets and the company’s assets should be treated the one and the same, the courts are not 
willing to accept this argument. Another interesting case from the case law of the United 
Kingdom, the Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd case proves this angle of the dispute.15 
Mr. Macaura was a landowner who sold timber from his estate to a company of which he was 
the sole owner. He insured the timber that was laying on his land under his own name as the 
insured person as shown by the policies issued by the insurance company. A few weeks later, 
the timber was destroyed in a fire. Macaura claimed the insurance money based on the insurance 
policy. The insurance company claimed that the timber belonged to the company and not to 
Macaura, and as a consequence of it, the destroyed timber was not properly insured, and the 
insurance company is not obliged to pay the insurance money. The court noted that the timber 
belonged to the company at the time of the fire, and Macaura is not identical to his private 
limited liability company, therefore, he had no insurable interest over the timber. This brief 
analysis of some historical cases in the laws of the United Kingdom proves that courts are 
willing to break the concept on the shareholders’ limited liability in cases when a clear 
fraudulent activity or intent of the shareholders can be proved. The concept of limited liability, 
however, stands in all other cases when the creditors or claimants simply wish to use the 
shareholders’ assets for satisfaction. We may conclude that the concept of limited liability of 
the shareholders separates the assets of the company from the assets of the shareholders, and 
the shareholders are not held liable for the contractual obligations of the company and for its 
debt under normal circumstances. Simply, until the shareholders play by the rules and respect 
the purpose of the limited liability principle, they are protected from the company’s creditors 
and, in general, from third party claims.  
 
14 United Kingdom, Kelner v Baxter (1866) LR 2 CP 174. 
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IV. Piercing the veil 
 
The concept of limited liability was originally created to protect shareholders from the 
inevitable risks of business activities and against the claims of those that suffer harms and 
damage as a consequence of the risky business activities. The doctrine also wanted to encourage 
investors to invest in businesses risking only the money they invested and not their own assets. 
If the doctrine is used to hide a malicious activity behind the thick veil of the company, 
shareholders cannot enjoy the protection of limited liability. The concept of limited liability 
might have overcome the norm of unlimited liability by the 19th century, legislators in Europe 
and the United States started to come up with excuses under the rule in order to make 
shareholders accountable for certain unlawful behaviors. One of the still existing exceptions is 
the problem when the shareholder transfers property to the company at an over evaluation of 
its true market value. Some authors resemble this problem as the problem of ‘watered stocks’.16 
Watered stocks are harmful to the other shareholders and the company, and to the creditors too. 
The company makes a bad deal in such situations, while the creditors get a false picture on the 
solvency and the capital of the company. This concept leads us back to the importance of the 
minimum core capital. Since the core capital was the price for the limited liability and also an 
instrument to build trust toward the creditors, any fraudulent activity related to the core capital 
may undermine its importance and function. In Europe, most national laws insisted on having 
an accountant or other professional to evaluate the monetary value of any in-kind performance 
a shareholder wanted to contribute with to the core capital. This rule, however, disappeared 
from many legal systems as it, especially in case of private companies, formed an unnecessary 
burden and expense at the time of company formation. It led to a more lenient policy that 
allowed shareholders to evaluate the monetary value of the in-kind performance with mutual 
consent, and also created liability on their side in case an over evaluation was carried out with 
bad faith.17 
Other historically relevant situations can also be identified in which the legislator felt the need 
for an exception to the limited liability principle. In the American continent, for example, some 
states (e.g. New York, Illinois, Canada) adopted the concept of shareholders’ joint and several 
liability for unpaid workers’ wages.18 This view emerged from the fear that limited liability will 
serve as a tool for the rich to consolidate their wealth, to the detriment of the workers.19 Also, 
certain exceptions were created to hold the shareholders liable for the full extent of their 
investment for company debts. It is an important principle when national laws levied the rules 
on when to pay the full amount of the shareholder’s contribution. In private companies, it is 
especially common that the legislator gives grounds for delayed payments, and the shareholder 
only has to provide a certain amount of his contributions at the time of formation; the rest may 
be paid at a later period of operation.20 This rule got significant importance in the years of the 
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time of registration of the company for making available the part of the cash contribution that was not paid before 
the application for registration is submitted, the company shall not be allowed to pay any dividend insofar as the 
unpaid profit calculated relative to the members core deposits according to the provisions on the payment of 
most recent financial crisis. In order to support businesses and to make the company formation 
process easier, mostly legislators in the European continent levied the rules on shareholder 
contribution. If, however, the company’s debts cannot be satisfied from the company’s assets, 
creditors may turn against the shareholders who still have not performed their full contributions 
as undertaken in the instrument of constitution of the company, and force them to pay the rest. 
It is an interesting observation how this rule made some plaintiffs to try their cases in situations 
of corporate torts against the creditors. Courts, however, systematically deny that such rules 
could give grounds to individual liability of the shareholders for torts committed by the 
company.21 It is clear that this rule was created only to help contractual creditors and not claims 
arisen from a tort.  
It seems to be the norm that shareholders may only be individually or jointly and severally 
liable toward third parties if these third parties are contractual creditors, and their claim arises 
from the fact that the company’s assets were insufficient to satisfy their claims. To summarize 
it, all fraudulent activities of the shareholders should somehow be connected to the intent to 
empty the company’s assets.  
 
V. Dominant shareholders 
 
In both public and private companies, shareholders act through majority decisions. A majority 
decision typically requires the consent of more than one shareholders, therefore, liability cannot 
be imposed on one of them simply by stating that they governed the company into insolvency. 
In a company, the owners are the shareholders, while the control over the daily operation is the 
duty of the management. Company managers or directors bear liability for the actions they take 
to represent the company toward the company itself. In most jurisdictions, they are rarely liable 
directly towards the creditors of the company or third parties who suffer harms or damage as a 
result of some tortious activity. Usually in tort cases, the directors are liable directly or jointly 
and severally with the company toward the third parties if they acted with intent.22 In contractual 
obligations, the legislator lists those cases when the directors owe a direct liability toward the 
company’s creditors.23 In the latter cases, the so-called wrongful trading principles may serve 
as grounds for the director’s liability toward the creditors of the company in case the company’s 
assets are not enough to satisfy their claims. Shareholders on the other hand do not have 
individual and direct liability toward the creditors even in these cases as they only marked some 
strategical points for the daily operation through their decisions in the supreme body. This 
concept immediately changes when a shareholder gets the majority of the shares, or he de facto 
or de jure exercises control over the operation of the directors. Controlling shareholders 
dominate the company through their majority voting rights or through their control rights over 
the management/directors, and it leads to two special forms in the shareholders’ liability. 
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In the first scenario, the controlling shareholder has majority votes, therefore, the decisions of 
the supreme body are heavily influenced by him, and they are dependent on his approval. As 
most national laws require simple majority in the supreme body for most decisions, a majority 
shareholder may easily decide over many important questions on his own. This dominant 
position makes him a sole shaper of the company’s strategies, and he may also be the one who 
can appoint or fire directors at will without the obligation to obtain consent from other 
shareholders. In the second scenario, the controlling shareholder has either de facto or de jure 
dominance over the managers of the company, so the directors act as for the order of the 
controlling shareholder. In such cases, the controlling shareholder’s liability may be similar to 
the director’s liability as the nature of their actions are comparable to the activities of the 
managers. Directors of the company must be loyal to the company, and it imposes the fiduciary 
duty of managers to serve the best interest of the company. Typically, the company’s interests 
come at first, and not the shareholders’. In practice, except for the specific cases of insolvency, 
the company’s interests may be very similar to the shareholders’ interests. The shareholders, as 
a group, form the company, so the director’s fiduciary duty can be interpreted as a duty toward 
the shareholders. National laws list various duties under the general scope of the fiduciary duty 
of the director, like the duty to fully disclose the conflict of interest and to obtain the 
shareholders’ approval in case there is a transaction between the company and the director. It 
also means that the breach of this duty may result a void transaction, and the breaching director 
will be liable for the profit he/she made under the transaction and for any loss the company 
might have suffered from the transaction. Some legal systems also entitle the company to 
recover damages from the third party as well.24 Another angle of the director’s fiduciary duty 
is that they bear individual liability for the consequences of their decisions toward the company. 
It requires directors to act using reasonable skill and care that presumes some professionalism 
at their end. While shareholders may be treated as lay investors, directors cannot use the defense 
of being a bystander as their duty toward the company involves a professional standard of care. 
Legal systems provide various solutions to the problem on how to treat the liability of the 
controlling shareholder. English company law steps up with the concept of the shadow director. 
The shadow director is “a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the 
directors of the company are accustomed to act”.25 This definition suggests that the act of the 
shadow director must amount to directions and instructions and must be intentionally influential 
to the activities of the de jure directors. While the definition of the shadow director is not that 
exact in Germany and Estonia, these civil law legal systems admit that in such cases the 
controlling shareholder’s liability must be similar to the de jure director’s.26 While a shadow 
director is not necessarily a controlling shareholder, in practice, he most likely holds a 
controlling block in the company. Once a controlling shareholder meets the requirements of a 
shadow director, English, German and Estonian company laws burden him with the same 
liability as for the de jure directors. The real conflict in this situation is that supreme body of 
the company has a right to decide on actions against both the de jure directors and the shadow 
director. As it seems obvious that a controlling shareholder would never vote against himself, 
the supreme body may fail to take actions, English law created the category of derivative action 
when an individual shareholder can sue in the name of the company. Civil law legal systems 
(e.g. Germany and Estonia), however, take procedural boundaries more seriously, therefore, 
derivate actions are not available solutions there. Therefore, most civil law legal systems order 
that a controlling shareholder cannot vote in such cases, and the majority shall be counted 
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among the other shareholders.27 The controlling shareholder is not a bystander in these cases, 
therefore, his biased vote will not count. While this special form of shareholders’ liability puts 
an increased level of vigilance on the controlling shareholder, we have to emphasize that even 
in these cases, the general conditions of liability must also be met. It is important to stress as in 
the fault-based liability regimes, the malicious, fraudulent intent of the shadow director must 
be proved in order to impose liability on him. It, however, may be an interesting scenario if the 
national law imposes strict, no-fault based liability on the directors for the damage they cause 
to the company. Hungarian law is a great example to this setting. The new Hungarian Civil 
Code says very little about the liability of directors as it refers to the rules of liability for 
damages for loss caused by non-performance of an obligation.28 These latter rules impose strict 
liability to the breaching party, therefore, fault is irrelevant when deciding over the liability. As 
the new Code is quite young, judicial practice has not had a chance to further interpret how 
these rules on liability for non-performance of a contractual obligation should be applied in 
cases when a company director breaches his fiduciary duties, however, unless the breaching 
party successfully proves that unforeseeable circumstances beyond his control served as an 
impediment and that caused the breach, he is held liable for the damages in a no-fault system. 
As a derivative of the rules, we may say that in Hungary, a controlling shareholder who acts as 
a shadow director may be liable for any loss the company suffers as a consequence of improper 
management activities, disregarding his fault. It also implies that the de jure directors may be 
jointly and severally liable together with the shadow director for such damages. We do not 
believe that the de jure directors can easily defend themselves by referring to the fact that their 
actions were instructed and controlled by the shadow director (controlling shareholder), as their 
loyalty and fiduciary duty is toward the company and not one of its shareholders.  
 
VI. Shareholders’ liability in the European Union 
 
In 2007, the European Union’s Council and the European Parliament adopted a Directive on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (Shareholder Rights 
Directive).29 The Directive lists a series of rights granted to shareholders in listed companies, 
mainly in relation to their voting rights and rights to information. The Directive does not, 
however, cover the issues of liability of shareholders, while other bits of EU legislation contain 
small traces of the problem. The EU Directive on single-member private limited liability 
companies30 sets an obligation that the fact that all shares of the company is held by a single 
person along with the identity of the sole member must either be recorded in the file or entered 
in the company register in the Member States.31 This provision ensures that creditors will get 
proper information about the company being controlled by a single shareholder, therefore, it is 
much easier to enforce the rules enacted for the cases of shareholder liability against the only 
member of the company, even if these cases of liability are listed in the national laws of the 
Member States. Still, none of the so-called company law directives contain clear liability rules 
against the shareholders, we may only find such situations established in the national laws. The 
company law related norms of the European Union have not moved to the direction when 
shareholders must act with due diligence and must prevent the company from getting insolvent. 
EU law does not impose clear fiduciary duties on the shareholders, it still focuses on the 
 
27 Hungary, Article 3:18 of the Civil Code 2013. 
28 Hungary, Article 3:24 of the Civil Code 2013. 
29 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies.  
30 Directive 2009/102/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 in the area of 
company law on single-member private limited liability companies. 
31 Article 3 of Directive 2009/102/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 in the 
area of company law on single-member private limited liability companies. 
management-shareholder relationship where shareholders must be armed against the 
autonomous activities of the directors, therefore, rights to provide sufficient information about 
the company’s operation to the shareholders are the main concern. 
In April 2014, the European Commission presented a proposal for the revision of the 
Shareholder Rights Directive to tackle corporate governance shortcomings related to the 
behavior of companies and their boards, shareholders, intermediaries and proxy advisors.32 The 
proposal aims to strengthen shareholder engagement in listed companies in order to make them 
more focused on the operation of the firm instead of being just simple investors. The proposal 
states that too often, shareholders support managers’ excessive short-term risk takings and do 
not monitor closely the companies they invested in. The proposal specifically mentions the lack 
of shareholder oversight on related party transactions as a source for the problem. According to 
the proposal, related party transactions cover transactions between a company and its 
management, directors, controlling entities or shareholders. These transactions typically create 
the opportunity to obtain value belonging to the company to the detriment of shareholders, 
especially minority shareholders, therefore, they impose a huge risk on the solvency of the 
company.33 The proposed rules would require listed companies that related party transactions 
representing more than 5% of the companies’ assets or transactions which can have a significant 
impact on profits or turnover to submit these transactions to the approval of shareholders and 
may not unconditionally conclude it without their approval.34 The proposal, however, aims to 
provide more rights to the shareholders, and plans to establish new obligations to the directors 
before engage the company into certain transactions. Failing to comply with the proposed rules 
would result liability for the directors, while the proposal does not cover the scenario when the 
shareholders abuse with these new rights and let a problematic and harmful transaction pass. 
We can see that EU law does not cover the problem of shareholders’ liability, so these questions 
are settled by national laws in very diverse ways. 
 
VII. Summary 
 
The concept of limited liability of the shareholders in a limited liability company started to 
erode from the moment the principle was established in order to cure the negative effects of the 
limited liability doctrine in company law. At first, the legislator only focused on clearly 
fraudulent and malicious behaviors of the shareholders in order to penetrate the protective 
corporate veil and allow creditors and third parties to carry out a lawsuit against the 
shareholders in a limited liability company. These days, company law has to fulfill various 
interests. On one hand, it has to ensure that its flexible enough to boost economy and urge the 
formation of companies in a country by both nationals and foreign investors. On the other hand, 
company laws must be secure and certain enough in order to offer safeguards and protection to 
the creditors, minority shareholders, employees and in some cases the members of the society. 
Corporate governance became an issue worldwide only in the last couple decades. This 
phenomenon does not only focus on the directors/managers of the companies but to the 
shareholders in the company burdening them with a more vigilant overseeing obligation over 
 
32 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as 
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement. 
33 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as 
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement Explanatory Memorendum point 2. 
34 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as 
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement. Legal Elements of the Proprosal no. 3. 
the management and the activities of the company. The European Union has not moved to the 
direction of creating clear cases of shareholder’s liability and to the direction of burdening 
shareholders with controlling obligations. Therefore, there is no general standard for the 
shareholders on what grounds they may be found liable for the company’s debts or in case of 
corporate torts. Still, certain situations may find the shareholders in a position when they have 
to face an increased level of duty of care and act as directors burdened with clear fiduciary 
duties. These situations are typically linked to the problems of controlling shareholders who 
often act as shadow directors, or shareholders in a dominant position overseeing and controlling 
a group of companies. While we do not suggest that shareholders have to bear a general liability 
for the misconduct of the company towards third parties, the new trends in corporate 
governance certainly claim for an increased and more precise list of the duties of the 
shareholders. The investor/shareholder position comes at many advantages in a limited liability 
company. Still, it should have its obligation side as well in order to establish a responsible 
behavior of companies toward the members of society and actors of the economy as well.  
